A Music Model of *Zettel* 608: Haydn and Beethoven

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Abstract

Most scholars understand para. 608 of *Zettel* (*Z*608) to suggest that language and thought might arise from chaos at the neural centre. Various commentators have suggested that Z608 holds that linguistic meaning may arise from connectionist chaos at the neural centre, causal indeterminacy at the neural centre, some generalized physical chaos at the neural centre, or even a pile of sawdust at the neural centre. However, such views contradict Wittgenstein's signature view in his later period that the philosopher "must not advance any kind of theory" (*Philosophical Investigations*, para. 109). Since Wittgenstein believed that music is not just for enjoyment but can "instruct" humanity, and since he repeatedly compared language to music, the paper proposes a music model of *Z*608. This music-model builds upon the alternative "Religious-Cosmological" interpretation of *Z*608 by virtue of the traditional connection, tracing to Pythagoras, between tonal music and cosmology, specifically, the view that musical harmonies (as it were, "musical meaning") arises from a chaos of sounds by virtue of (musical) movement *towards* the stabilizing tonal centre. After first discussing this connection between music and cosmology in general terms the paper discusses the role of this religious-cosmological imagery in two of Wittgenstein's most revered composers, Haydn and Beethoven. Finally, the paper shows how this music-model illuminates not just *Z*608 but Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language in general. The conclusion is that producing a language is less like pasting labels on things and more like composing traditional tonal music. Since Haydn's and Beethoven's music reflects the aesthetic and ethical structure of the classical cosmos, the image in *Z*608 is, in effect, the image of the emergence of the cosmic symphony from chaos by virtue of (musical) movement towards the true centre, with all of the aesthetic and ethical dimensions this involves, that pervades Western religion, cosmology, literature, music, and art. On this music-model the resolution of philosophical problem is not like the resolution of scientific or engineering problems but is more like the resolution of Haydn's or Beethoven's problems. Thus, the music-model of *Z*608 illustrates the meaning in Wittgenstein's 1936 remark (reproduced in *Culture and Value*) that there is a "queer resemblance" between philosophical (conceptual) and aesthetic investigations.

> People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians, etc., to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them – that does not occur to them.
>
> *Culture and Value* (36)

Music, for Wittgenstein "was not an interest but an all-consuming passion" that had "to be at the centre, not the periphery, of his life" (Monk, 1990, 12). Since Wittgenstein holds that music can "instruct" humanity, it seems reasonable that this perspective is reflected in his philosophy. The key passage is paragraph 608 of *Zettel* (hereafter *Z*608) in Wittgenstein's "later philosophy" (hereafter WLP).[1] Most scholars understand *Z*608 to claim that language and thought may arise out of physical chaos at the neural centre (hereafter the Neurological Interpretation or NI). The Religious-Cosmological Interpretation (hereafter RCI), inspired by Wittgenstein's remark to Drury that he cannot help looking at problems from a religious point of view (Malcolm, 1997, 1), holds that the language in *Z*608 is religious creation-language. RCI sees the references to the "arising" of order from "chaos" at "the centre" in *Z*608 as *figurative* literary language that *compares* the production of language to the *genesis* of a cosmos from chaos (McDonough, 2015): "What I invent are new similes" (*CV*, 19). Since the same creation-language is found in several of Wittgenstein's revered composers the paper develops a music-model of *Z*608 and explains how it sheds light on WLP.[2]

§ 1 states several constraints on an acceptable interpretation of WLP. § 2 rehearses RCI's criticism of NI. § 3 sketches the positive message in RCI. § 4 discusses the role of the cosmological imagery of the emergence of order from chaos at the centre in traditional *tonal* music. § 5 discusses the role of this religious-cosmological imagery in Wittgenstein's revered composers, Haydn and Beethoven. § 6 presents the Music Model of *Z*608 (hereafter MMZ) and explains how it illuminates WLP.

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[1] Although occasional reference is made to Wittgenstein's early philosophy (hereafter WEP), the paper is primarily concerned with WLP. By WEP is meant Wittgenstein's *Tractatus-logico-philosophicus* and *Notebooks, 1914-16—TLP*. By his "later philosophy" is meant the *Philosophical Investigations, Zettel, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, On Certainty*, and most of the remarks in *Culture and Value—PI, Z, RFM* and *CV* respectively. References to *TLP* are by proposition number, to *CV* by page number, to *PI, Z,* and *OC,* unless indicated otherwise, by paragraph number, to *RFM* are by section and paragraph number.

[2] Although Wittgenstein may have been the most musical and most musically educated of the great philosophers since Al Farabi he is seldom mentioned in recent philosophy of music (Scruton, 2009, 3). Botstein (1993, 132) remarks on the "lamentable paucity of commentary" on Wittgenstein by music theorists.

1. The Basic Principles of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Language and Thought

> [W]e may not advance any kind of theory. … We must do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place.
>
> *Philosophical Investigations* (109)

Since WLP is purely *descriptive*, *Z*608 cannot consistently advance any *theories* or *explanations* (See also *RFM*, II, 78, 81; *CV*, 30, 32; *Z*, 314)). WLP is uninterested in what goes on in the brain while someone is speaking or thinking (*PI*, 158, 427). WLP holds rather that philosophical problems result from misunderstanding the correct uses the words in everyday language (*PI*, 90). Often the source of these misunderstandings is a philosophical *theory* that makes one want something impossible or senseless (*PI*, 426). Since such misunderstandings arise because the grammar of natural languages suggest misleading analogies, the resolution of philosophical problems requires a "perspicuous representation" of the uses of words (*PI*, 122). Since the uses of words reside in everyday linguistic practices they are "open to view" (*PI*, 126). WLP only attempts to *remind* one that what one needs to resolve philosophical problems is "always before one's eyes" (*PI*, 129; *CV*, 63). Therefore, the neuroscientist's hidden mechanisms are of no interest to WLP. For WLP, a successful resolution of philosophical problems must satisfy three conditions: C1: The philosopher must not advance any explanations or *theories*; C2: The philosopher *describes* phenomena that are not "hidden" but are "open to view"; C3: The "open" phenomena are the everyday uses of words that are "right before one's eyes".

2. Critique of the Neurological Interpretation

> No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from brain processes. I mean this: if I talk or write, there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak [*sozusagen*], out of chaos? …
>
> *Zettel* (608)

McGinn (1984, 12–13, 112–114) thinks *Z*608 suggests that normal human heads might turn out to be filled with sawdust. Scheer (1991) thinks it suggests the possibility of causal indeterminism in the brain. Davies (1991), Mills (1993) and Sutton (2014) separately

claim that it suggests connectionist models of neural processing. Ben-Yami (2005) thinks that it holds that it is possible that the brains of normal people might be physically chaotic. Hark (1995) thinks it is a critique of Köhler's theory of electric brain-fields.[3] All of the different versions of NI agree both that the "centre" and "chaos" mentioned in Z608 are the neural centre and neural chaos and that the chaos is where the centre is (the brain). Thus, all hold that *Z*608 suggests that language may arise out of physical chaos in the brain.

The first problem with NI is that the second sentence in *Z*608 *denies* that the brain is in chaos and *affirms* a correlation between the brain and language and thought: "[T]here is, I assume, a *system* of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts." This is why Wittgenstein dismisses McGinn's picture of sawdust in the head: "*I*, L.W. ... am sure that my friend hasn't sawdust in his body or in his head … To have doubts about this would seem to me madness" (*OC*, 281). WLP sees such theories as not just wrong but "madness". This would have to be true because WLP "leaves everything as it is" (*PI*, 124). WLP cannot consistently propose new (and radical) theories about the brain. Since NI reads *Z*608 in the light of its own neural paradigm it misconstrues its real point.

The second obvious problem with the various versions of NI is that *Z*608 does *not* state that language and thought may arise out of chaos but only that they may, "*sozusagen* [so to speak]" do so (McDonough, 2015, 89-94). WLP's method is not to state theories but to make philosophically illuminating *comparisons* (*PI*, 130-131; *RFM*, V.12; *CV*, 19). *Z*608 *compares* the production of language with the emergence of order from chaos at the centre but does not *assert* any *theory* that language and thought might *literally* emerge from chaos at some "centre." There is no *emergence theory* in *Z*608.[4] One can also show that this has to be the case by invoking principles C1-C3 of Wittgenstein's later philosophy (See § I).

First, whereas C1 states that the philosopher must not advance any kind of *theories*, NI proposes *extravagant* theories about what is going on in the heads of normal language-users. Second, whereas C2 states that the philosopher's job is to describe what is "open

[3] The argument in this and the following section is based on McDonough (2015).
[4] For a sketch of emergence theories see McDonough (2002)!

to view," NI is concerned with hidden neural processes: "Now ask yourself: what do you know about these things [in the brain]" (*PI*, 158). Third, whereas C3 states that the phenomena of interest to philosophers are uses of words, NI's key concepts concern physical processes. If *Z*608 had been written by Patricia Churchland (1989) it might make sense that "centre" and "chaos" are the neural centre and neural chaos but this makes no sense for a passage in WLP. Since WLP restricts itself to descriptions of what is "open to view" the natural inference is that the centre and chaos referenced in *Z*608 must be of a sort that is "open to view"—and, in fact, WLP elsewhere identifies this open public centre and public chaos.

At *PI* (108) Wittgenstein states that his investigations must focus on "the fixed point [*Angelpunkt*] of our real need." However, the literal translation of "*Angelpunkt*" is "center-point" (Traupman, 1991, 17. *PI* (108) identifies this "center-point" as "ordinary life". That is the "centre" in *Z*608. Indeed, the idea that language or ordinary life, or, perhaps, "forms of life" (*PI*, p. 226), have a *structure* involving a centre and a periphery is *very* interesting.[5]

Wittgenstein also employs chaos-imagery elsewhere. At *CV* (65) he suggests that the philosopher must learn to make a home in "primeval chaos"—but there is nothing "primeval" about the brain and one cannot make a "home" in it. WLP also refers to this chaos in human life at *Z*567 when he states that "what determines our judgment" (about what something means) is "the background" consisting of "the *ganze Gewimmel* [great swarm] of human actions." For WLP, linguistic meaning is something that is phenomenologically available in human life. Roughly, an expression E means M if and only if E forms part of a certain pattern that arises against the chaotic background swarm of human activities. WLP holds that philosophy requires a descent into the chaotic swarm of activities at the centre-point of ordinary life in order to discern the unseen linguistic order in the chaos of activities there.[6]

[5] Compare Quine's (2013, 11, 16, 28) distinction between the centre and periphery of language!
[6] For a more detailed discussion of WLP's concept of the "chaos of life" see McDonough (2004, 319-323)!

3. The Religious-Cosmological Interpretation of *Zettel* 608

> [Wittgenstein told] his close friend Drury: "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view."
>
> Malcolm, *Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View?* (1)

Since there is a considerable religious-cosmological dimension to much traditional music it is useful briefly to sketch the basic points of RCI that contrast with NI. Whereas NI, *presupposing* its own brain-centred paradigm, reads the direction of motion of the neural impulses in *Z*608 as proceeding *towards* the neural centre,[7] RCI holds that, read carefully, *Z*608 implies that the neural impulses are moving *from* the neural centre *towards* the "spoken and written thoughts" in the public "centre-point of our real need" (ordinary life). RCI's inspiration for this reading is taken from religious views in which the dominant image is the achievement of (religious) meaning by moving *towards* the true (religious) centre of human life, whatever, on a given religious view, this is (God, Christ, Allah, etc.). The whole point in many religious views is that if one misidentifies the centre of human life as something material (wealth, fame, beauty, etc.) one comes to ruin. In order to achieve the true purpose of human life and bring order to the chaos, light to the darkness, goodness to evil, one must proceed away from the false material centre and *towards* the true (religious) centre. Since the chaos is where the centre is that means that the chaos is not in the brain but in the chaotic *Ganze Gewimmel* of human activities out of which, according to WLP, language arises.

RCI does *not* claim that *Z*608 has any hidden religious meaning. *Z*608 is about the genesis of language and thought—not religion. Rather, following WRD, *Z*608 uses religious views as *similes* to motivate a new "point of view" as an alternative to the materialistic models that predominant in the philosophy of mind in Wittgenstein's (and the present) day. Just as many religious views hold that one must turn away from the false material centre of life (money, fame, pleasure, etc.) and toward the true religious centre in order to find the authentic meaning of life, RCI holds that philosophers of language must turn away from the false material centre of language (the brain) and towards the true centre of human language, the public world of human activities from which WLP holds meaning 'arises".

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[7] Churchland (1989, 158-160, 165-166, 181-182) identifies several such physical neural centres.

4. The Structure of Traditional Tonal Music

> [M]usical instinct, to begin with, was totally inartistic and only very gradually rose from a chaos of fog to an artistic principles. … [This] may have contributed to the creation of the tonal systems which facilitated a firmer and more lasting grip on those [primitive] melodies.
>
> Schenker, *Harmony* (134, 137)

Tonality is a system of music that orders pitches or chords to produce a hierarchy of perceived relations, stabilities, and attractions (Hyer, 2001). The triadic chord or pitch with the greatest stability is called the "tonal centre" or "the tonic." The other tones in the musical piece are arranged around the tonal centre to produce the melody or harmony out of tension and dissonance (Clark, 2008, 132).[8] Not all musical systems are tonal but most European music from 1600 to 1910 involves a "referential tonal center" (Hyer, 2001). Although the Austrian composer Schoenberg (1983, 27, 71, 152-153) experiments with a departure from tonality he remarks that tonality traditionally has been seen as "an eternal law, the natural law of music". Since the tonal centre is employed to produce a melody or harmony out of dissonant sounds, the notions of the tonal centre and dissonance go hand in hand. Sometimes musicologists explicitly speak of chaotic sounds (Schenker, 2008, 53), but more often they talk of dissonant or discordant sounds. The notion of the tonal centre is discussed in IV.1. The dialectical relation between the tonal centre and the dissonant chaos is discussed in IV.2. The present aim is not to produce the final word on the very complex topic of tonality but only to illustrate the key musical concepts needed to understand the music *analogy* in *Z*608.

[8] See the directions for producing a tonal melody in Fig. I.2 of Brown (2005, 4-5). This is intended only as an example of *one* traditional recipe for producing a melody.

4.1. The Tonal Centre

> [A tritone] … may appear within a tonal context of a major or minor harmonic or melodic) key scheme. … [This] provide[s] the harmonic and melodic impetus for tonal resolution. This gravitational pull provides the necessary tonal flavour for … **tonality** [boldface in original], the tonal centre.
>
> D'Amante, *Music Fundamentals* (197-198)

It is often natural to describe the structure of a musical piece in *dynamic* terms. A specific placement of tones is described as a "tension" which requires a "resolution" (Brown, 2005, 9-10, 88, 197).[9] Since the tonic is the central "referential" point for the various tones in the piece, it is "the target towards which the other tones lead", and, therefore, is "the tone of complete relaxation" (Benward & Saker, 2003, 36). The arrangement of dissonant tones creates a tension, or problem, which is *resolved* by returning to the relaxing consonance of the tonal center. Thus, much tonal music depends on a "narrative adventure," which might be cyclically repeated in a musical piece "away from and back to the tonic" (Kramer, 2005, 36). (Brown, 2005, 4-5) paraphrases one recipe for *producing* a tonal relationship:

> First, one picks a "final tonic" for the "melody as a whole." Second, one begins the melody on a member of the tonic triad and ends with a stepwise descent onto that tonic. Third, one picks a climax note midway through the melody and not more than one octave above the tonic. Fourth, one reinforces the tonic at the opening. Fifth, one joins the opening to the climax.

The melody begins on a member of the tonal centre, proceeds through a various cycles in which the tonic is successively abandoned and reinforced until one finally joins the opening to the climax by returning in the climax to the tonal centre in the opening—producing the satisfying impression of a coherent whole in which the problem has been solved. The whole is coherent because it *returns upon itself* by returning to the tonic of the melody as a whole at various key points (especially at the climax). The crucial point is that the tonal centre is the "referential tonic" in the sense that it is "the target towards which the other tones lead".

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[9] There are many types of pre-20th century European music that violate these norms and "laws", e.g., Debussy's music "frequently treats dissonances without preparation or resolution" (Brown, 2005, 172). However, such *exceptions* do not affect the present point.

4.2. The Dialectical Relationship between the Tonal Centre and Dissonant "Chaos"

> Centuries ago early musicians of the cloth called the triton the "*Diabolus in musica*." The reference to the devil was based on concern for the … dissonance found in the tritone interval of the augmented fourth or diminished fifth. However unacceptable [it] may have been, it was found to be … vital. Strategically placed and properly resolved within a traditional musical context, it provides the very essence of tonality—the establishment of a tonal key centre.
>
> D'Amante, *Music Fundamentals* (197-198)

In traditional tonal theory, an "unstable" dissonance of tones produces a tension which demands a "resolution" via "an onward motion to a stable chord" (Kamien, 1998, 44). This movement is effected via the "gravitational pull" of the tonal centre which can be seen as imposing order on the dissonant chaos of chords, ending the tension. Of course, there is no *real* gravitational pull here. The composer arranges the tones to make it seem *as if* this is so.

It is noteworthy that many musical theorists found it natural to represent the dialectical relationship between dissonant sounds and tonal centre *from a religious point of view* on analogy with a religious conflict between good and evil, light and darkness, order and chaos:

> Dissonance was said to invoke cosmological chaos, political unrest, as well as death, eroticism, and the inadequacies of language, whereas harmony signified hierarchical order, unity, the movement of the spheres, and God (Clark, 2008, 130).

For example, Handel, in his setting to music of Dryden's *Ode for St Cecilia's Day* employs dissonant sounds in the opening lines to expresses the "jarring atoms of the [primordial] chaos" (Weinbrot, 2001, 18-19)—the setting for the subsequent emergence of cosmic order from chaos. This analogy between the structure of music and the structure of the cosmos derives partly from the fact that many musicians are inspired by religious literature. However, it is not simply that the religious analogy applies to the music because the music is inspired by religious views but that *the structure of the music itself reflects the cosmic structure* Indeed, the link between music and the cosmos is as old as Pythagoras and Plato (James, 1995, 20-30). The view that a musical piece is a *microcosm*

of the cosmos traces to Pythagoras (Pont, 2004).[10] Just as the cosmic order is brought into being from the primordial chaos by the gravitational pull of the cosmic centre, so a musical order is brought into being from the dissonant chaos of sounds by the "gravitational pull" of the tonal centre. Thus, the concepts of the centre and chaos are internally related in both religion and in tonal music.

5. The Religious-Cosmological Model in Haydn and Beethoven

> In later life Wittgenstein was fond of saying that there are just six great composers: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, and Labor.
>
> Monk, *The Duty of Genius* (8)

All six of Wittgenstein's great composers employ tonality and all have substantial Austrian roots.[11] Since Haydn is the first of Wittgenstein's six great composers the main argument is made in V.1 with regard to his Overture, "Representation of Chaos," in his *Die Schöpfung* (*The Creation*). The significance of Wittgenstein's remark that Beethoven (with Mozart) is one of the two "sons of God" (Monk, 1990, 57) is explained in § V. 2.

1.) Haydn's *Representation of Chaos*

> Haydn's remarkable *Representation* [*Vorstellung*] *of Chaos* ... culminates in a progression across three … movements … from paradoxical disorder to triumphant order; it offers a perceptible and memorable experience of [the] unfathomable, unthinkable … origins of the universe … This is essential to the sublimity of the first day [of creation].
>
> Webster, "The Sublime and the Pastoral in the *Creation*" (154-155)

Haydn's "Representation of Chaos" is an attempt at the superhuman task of presenting a musical representation of the initial stages of the creation of the cosmos from primordial chaos. For a start, how does one represent the primordial chaos in music? Haydn's problem is compounded by the fact that the presence of this *aporia* in his "Representation of Chaos" is meant to represent "the measure of the distance that separates the still

[10] "[T]he 'analogy of the macrocosm and microcosm' became the 'harmony of the spheres' when the earthly imitation of the heavenly dance was finally reinterpreted as a system of harmonic proportions shared by macrocosm and microcosm" (Pont, 2004).

[11] Haydn was born in Rohau, Austria. Mozart was born in Salzburg, Austria. Beethoven was born in Bonn, Germany but moved to Vienna at age 21 to study with Hadyn. Labor was born in Hořovice in Bohemia, with historical roots in Hapsburg Austria and later moved to Vienna. Schubert was born in Vienna. Brahms was born in Hamburg Germany but spent much of his professional life in Vienna.

incipient cosmos from God, particularly the God of Revelation who affirms 'I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last" (Kramer, 2005, 84). The fact that this *aporia* is inescapable reflects the necessary imperfection of mere human music to represent something so sublime. Haydn's representation of creation is sublime in Kant's sense that we find ourselves "confronted with something that is so large that it overwhelms imagination's capacity to comprehend it" (Ginsborg, 2013, § 2.7). Further, Haydn's *Representation of Chaos* must represent the *unity* of alpha and omega, the beginning and the end. The problem is not merely that one must represent that which is, for human beings, un-representable. An additional problem is that the incipient cosmic order must already be somehow present in the un-representable primordial chaos—but how can that be? For such reasons Haydn's contemporaries feared that his *Representation of Chaos* might have to "court" the chaotic and end up "more muddle than metaphor" (Kramer, 2005, 85).

Haydn's solution to this problem consists in the fact that his chaos-music is not (and cannot be) *literally* chaotic. He constructs the opening of his *Representation of Chaos* "so [that] we must hear it as raw material, an *Urklang* [primordial sound], not yet intelligible, not yet even music" Kramer (2005, 74). The crucial point is that one must "hear" it as an *Urklang*. That does not mean it *is* an *Urklang* (because it obviously cannot be one). Since human modes of representation are so far removed from God's powers, Haydn must try to "model what exceeds representation" by means of certain human *devices*, specifically, "the logic of antimony, imperfection, blockage" (Kramer, 2005, 85). Haydn's biographer, Carpani, describes "the opening C "as a dull indefinite surge of sound" that "fades to black" (Kramer, 2005, 75). The next measure begins to "assemble the raw materials of a harmony" and subsequent measures follow to a "dissonant polyphony around the dominant C minor in measure 3." The "un-harmonized phrase" in measure 4 "echoes" the original *Urklang* but also consolidates the dominant of C minor." Kramer (2005, 75) states the key point:

> The next measure will bring … a new orchestral thrust that fades into the chaos chord—but a horizon of consonance has been traced, a cadence promised. Tonal harmony has evolved from an unharmonized tone. With this gesture Hadyn forms the nucleus of everything that follows … The movement proceeds by repeating the basic action of the opening … in expanded forms.

This cycle is repeated again and again until in the climactic *lux fiat* ("Let there be light!") at the conclusion repeats and revises the movement from the unharmonized tone at the primordial beginning to tonal harmony at the climax whereupon the "chaos chord" disappears and the unaccompanied chorus exclaims "*Und Gott sprach*," "*Es werde Licht*", and "*Und es ward Licht*" (Kramer, 2005, 86-87). At the creation of light, "the chorus and orchestra join in an unmuted forte to proclaim the birth of light with a full cadence … on the brighter and more stable tonic major" (Kramer, 2005, 87). The omega (birth of light) at the climax is joined to the alpha (chaos and darkness) at the primordial beginning. The creation "arises by repeating its own prehistory in 'harmonious' form" (Kramer, 2005, 86). Thus, Haydn's creation music represents the arising of a cosmos from chaos where the cosmic order arises via the steady movement, in a series of evolutionary cycles, *towards* the tonal center.

The problem Haydn faces in his music is analogous to the problem philosopher's face, as at *TLP* (Preface) and *PI* (119), when they find themselves compelled to go beyond the limits of language and represent the un-representable. Thus, Haydn finds himself forced to represent God's sublime creative act by employing the feeble human musical devices.[12] That one cannot be entirely successful in representing this sublime divine act has the *positive* significance of emphasizing the distance between fallen humanity and God.

There is an additional point that must be made about the (broadly) *ethical* role of Haydn's *Die Schöpfung*. A performance of *Die Schöpfung* is intended "to bring the music of the spheres into public life" in a "great communal occasion" leading to "the recovery of cosmic harmony" (Kramer, 2005, 92). It is hoped that the music can produce "the oneness and the humility of an awed humanity confronted by the works of God" (Kramer, 2005, 93). Any listener, from a Prince to a plumber, could "hear the primal consonance and applaud it like one of the sons of God" (Kramer, 2005, 92).[13] The significance of Wittgenstein's identification of Beethoven as one of the "sons of God" is explained in the next subsection.

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[12] The present question is not whether Haydn was successful in this musical task. That is a fascinating question the solution to which would require addressing many philosophical and musical issues. What is important here is only the light that Haydn's efforts shed on Z608.

[13] Goethe claimed to hear these cosmic harmonies in Bach's music (Bodley, 2009, 13).

2.) The "Sons of God"

> You could … say that both Wagner and Brahms, each in his different way, imitated Beethoven; but what in him was cosmic becomes earthly with them.
> *Culture and Value* (81)

Beethoven and Haydn are linked in that each attempts in their music to advance, with important differences, certain shared religious cultural ideas. Beethoven builds on Haydn's musical representation of the creation of the cosmos from chaos,[14] but in his *Ninth Symphony* the creation-theme is combined with his ethical-political ideal:

> After noting certain similarities between the scenarios of Haydn's *Creation* and [Beethoven's] *Ninth Symphony*, Baensch asserts that Beethoven "starts with a portrait of chaos … and crowns the Symphony with the drama of the close of man's history, in the Elysian state of civilization. … [Thus,] the Ninth Symphony is intended as a musical analogue of a mythic, a cosmic history
> (Solomon, 2003, 11).

The creation of the cosmos is expanded to include the creation of humanity in history. To be sure, Solomon (2003, 13) stresses that the symbolism in Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* is not limited to these religious-cosmogonic themes, but, returning to the philosophical view that some things are beyond the limits of human representation, explains that this is because parts of the meaning of Beethoven's music is "beyond translation—beyond intentionality".

Similar religious-cosmogonic themes are repeated in Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*, called the "Overtura," combined with the idea of the healing power of art:

> The Overtura's primary image is of a chaoticized state of being, order will eventually emerge from this splintered chaos, the fragments coalescing into a three part fugue, a coherent universe assembled from improbably ingredients. Thus, the Overtura is … a representation of chaos, of fracture and assembly, a representation of art's restorative power (Solomon, 2003, 241)

[14] Beethoven's fascination with "religious, metaphysical, and mystical ideas" traces to his student days: His diary contains "excepts from the Rig-Veda, the Bhagavad-Gita … as well as passages from Kant's early essay on cosmology … The image of the stars as the gateway to heaven fascinated Beethoven (and in the finale of the Ninth Symphony inspired some of his most sublime music" (Stanley, 2000, 30).

Ratner (1995), borrowing an expression from *Paradise Lost* (Bk 1, line 26) describes the Overtura as an attempt to "justify the ways of God to men."[15]

It is Beethoven's use of such cosmic themes that leads Wittgenstein to describe him as one of the "sons of God". The expression "sons of God" ["*Bene elohim*"] has a specific history. In the *Kaballah* the "sons of God" are part of the Jewish angelic hierarchies (Blau and Kohler, 1906). In the Hebrew Bible the term applies to righteous human beings who recognize God as the father of creation.[16] Wittgenstein is not merely engaging in hyperbole when he calls Beethoven one of the "sons of God". His point is that one does not listen to Beethoven for the reasons one listens to popular music (because it sounds nice). Beethoven is one of the "sons of God" because his "cosmic" music teaches something sublime that is of the greatest importance, including ethical element, about the creation of the cosmos and human history. But these are the same themes examined in much great literature, which is why Beethoven called himself a *Tondichter* (tone-poet) (Swafford, 2014, 45, 228).[17] Thus, to "applaud" such creation-music like one of "the sons of God" (See §V.2 above) is to applaud it as someone who, recognizing their humble place in God's creation, approximates to the wisdom and purity displayed in the angelic hierarchy.

6. The Music-Model of *Zettel* 608

> [T]he disappearance of the arts does not justify judging disparagingly the human beings who make up this civilization. For in times like these genuine strong characters simply leave the arts aside and turn to other things. … So I am not aiming at the same target as the scientists and my way of thinking is different from theirs.
>
> *Culture and Value* (6-7)

RCI's main criticism of NI is that *Z*608 does *not* say that language arises out of chaos at the neural centre, but that the neural impulses move *from* the brain *towards* the public world of human activities in which language has its "home". Thus, the "centre" mentioned

[15] Pope's *Essay on Man* (line 16) replaces "justify" by "vindicate".

[16] See the editors explanatory note to line 463 of Bk III of *Paradise Lost*. Kaminski (2008) makes the same point when she argues that "beautiful" in this context really means "good" *in the light of the creation story* in Genesis 1-3. Milton also refers to the "sons of Heaven" in Bk I (line 654). References to the "sons of God" occur in Genesis 6:2; Job 1: 6 & 38: 7 and Psalms 29: 1.

[17] Recall Beethoven's remark, made in the context of his criticism that Goethe was too distracted by court "glitter", that poets *should* be regarded as the "only" teachers of mankind (Comini, 2008, 17-18)!

in *Z*608 is the "center-point of our real need" (roughly, ordinary life). This also means that the chaos referenced in *Z*608 is the chaos of human activities that is "already before one's eyes".

MMZ makes a similar point: Since the centre referenced in MMZ is the tonal centre and the chaos is dissonant sounds, MMZ represents the resolution of the tensions created by this chaotic dissonance, borrowing *Z*608's language, by movement that "continues further in the direction of the [tonal] centre". Just as Haydn and Beethoven strive to represent how a musical order can arise from dissonant chaos by movement towards the (tonal), *Z*608 asks why linguistic meaning may not arise from the chaos of human activities by continuing further in the direction of "the *Angelpunkt* [centre-point] of our real need." The *theory* that musical order emerges from hidden neural processes does not even arise when *describing* the *heard* (right before one's ears) emergence of musical order from dissonant chaos.

This suggests that *PI* (108)'s "centre-point of our real need" operates in language much like the ordering gravitational pull of the tonal centre in tonal music: "What we do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (*PI*, 116). The nonsensical excesses in metaphysics are resolved (like dissonance in music) by "continuing further in the direction of the *Angelpunkt* of our real need" (ordinary life).[18] *Z*608 attempts to illuminate the *concept* of linguistic meaning by *comparing* the arising of linguistic meaning with the arising of tonal harmonies. Thus, the picture inspiring *Z*608 is the same religious-cosmological picture found in the tonal music in Wittgenstein's most revered composers.

Since this musical centre and chaos are present in the heard phenomenon of music MMZ satisfies the three conditions C1-C3 for a correct reading of a passage in WLP. First, MMZ does not propose any theories about the hidden *causes* of the music. Second, MMZ only adverts to the phenomena that are "open to view" in the heard music. Third, since MMZ trades on the analogy between the *uses* of sounds in a musical piece and the *uses* of words in language, the open phenomena to which MMZ refers are the uses of

[18] Compare Lidov's (2005, 162) application of the notion of movement towards the tonic to poetry!

sounds in a musical piece. MMZ sees language as *like* music in these respects: "Nothing is hidden" (*PI*, 435).

One might object that the analogy on which MMZ rests is strained because the "tonal centre" in a musical piece does not literally cause the arising of musical harmonies. That is done, in different ways, by the composer who writes the piece and the musician who performs it. However, this does not contradict, but, rather, *supports* MMZ. One of the main points in RCI's critique of NI is that *Z*608 does not say that the order in language arises out of chaos at the centre but that it, "*sozusagen*," does so. Since there is no *real* gravitational pull by the tonal centre one might say that the harmony in a piece of music, *sozusagen*, arises out of a chaos of sounds by virtue of the "gravitational pull" of the tonal centre. Similarly, the notes in a musical performance do not literally *move* towards the tonal centre, but one might say that they, *sozusagen*, do so. That is, the concept of the "gravitational pull" of the tonal centre is cashed in terms of *aesthetic*, not physical, considerations (This note completes this sequence, that one is too discordant here, etc.). This illustrates the meaning in Wittgenstein's remark that there is a "queer resemblance" between philosophical and aesthetic investigations (*CV*, 25). Just as one asks what is *aesthetically* wrong about a musical piece if it is to represent something (like irony), one must ask what is aesthetically wrong with language if it is to represent something. Of course, scholars often ask how a sentence should be crafted if it is to represent something adequately—but what is novel in WLP is that *aesthetic* issues are assigned an integral part of the account of linguistic meaning *as such*. By contrast, such aesthetic considerations find *no* place in modern attempts to produce a *science* of language.[19]

In summary, MMZ represents Z608 to be suggesting that producing a language is less like pasting labels on things and more like composing (tonal) music. Since Haydn's and Beethoven's music reflects the aesthetic and ethical structure of the classical cosmos,[20] the image in *Z*608 is, in effect, the image of the cosmic symphony, with all of the aesthetic and ethical dimensions that this involves, that pervades Western religion, cosmology, literature, music, and art. Thus, the resolution of philosophical problem is not

[19] E.g., Fodor's (1975, 68) account of language resembles the description of a machine: "I shall continue to rely very heavily on the machine analogy ….". Since Fodor (1975, 66) sees the solution to philosophical problems on analogy with an "engineering" problem WLP's aesthetic issues simply do not arise for Fodor.
[20] For a sketch of the aesthetic dimension of the classical cosmos see McDonough, "Plato: Organicism", § 3 a!

like the resolution of scientific or engineering problems.[21] It is more like the resolution of Haydn's or Beethoven's problems. Unfortunately, "in times like these," when the exclusive dominance of the sciences has led to the decline of culture and the relegation of literature art and music to mere pleasurable pursuits, this is not likely to be appreciated. It is, perhaps, a measure of "the poverty and darkness of our time" (*PI*, Preface) that the sublime literary cosmic and historical creation-symbolism in *Z*608 is, "in times like these," automatically interpreted to propose unrealistic and unpalatable neurophysiological theories (in a philosopher who eschews all such theories) that language and thought might literally arise from some physical disorder, perhaps even a pile of sawdust, in the centre of the head.

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[21] See note 19 above!

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