Kasper Eskelund has read my book very closely, for which I am grateful and honored. I will briefly comment on the interesting critical remarks regarding the relation between noise as a sensual phenomenon and noise as a concept.
KE summarizes my philosophical reflections and concludes that the formal properties of the Sublime, the Abject, the Dionysian and so on ”are not shared by the phenomena” but that there is instead a relation of ’pointing’ between the two, which he calls a ”remarkable twofold ontology”. This causes him to doubt if there is any relevant connection between them, apart from ”a fascination with the image of a pure noise”. He also suggests that the observation that noisy sounds attain their meaning by an overcharging of consciousness, forcing the central nervous system to project form into the formless is a speculative one that is derived solely from the philosophical concepts in the last part of the book.
1. The ”pointing” between the concept of noise and noisy phenomena in music is, as I have pointed out (p. 91 and 103), a metonymic one. This implies that (the phenomenon) noise has some of the qualities of (the concept) ”noise”. I describe these ecstatic experiences and overwhelming expressions in relation to concrete musical examples. Hence, they are not merely speculative, even though the philosophical concepts are pure, whereas the phenomenal, musical expressions are mixed – except maybe in the instance of Merzbow. The relation is metonymic rather than detached.
2. Furthermore, it would be curious if noise and ”noise” were not connected. How would the concept become autonomous to a degree where there was no relation to its phenomenal object anymore? The fact that there will always remain a discrepancy (a non-identity) between concept and object should not lead to a ”twofold ontology”, but perhaps rather to a dialectical examination of this relation. I admit that I have not performed this task in any detail, as my end was rather to perform various reflections in an attempt to understand aspects of the musical phenomena better. Therefore my focus was primarily constructive – I emphasized the points of connection between the two. This makes it even more surprising that it can be read as a twofold ontology.
3. The overcharging of consciousness is not primarily a philosophical and speculative one. It is a very concrete experience, and I believe I have described it in this way. I account for the very concrete experience of noisy urban soundscapes, of being overwhelmed by too many frequencies, of phantom voices etc. etc. I agree that it would perhaps be satisfying with specific neurological evidence as a backup for these descriptions, and anyone are welcome to add references and scientific evidence for or against the assumption of neurological information overload. This way we can only become wiser.
Torben Sangild
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